| Mobilizing
for E-Strategy
By Kenneth Cline
As Bill Harrison accelerates Internet
strategy at Chase Manhattan, he must pick his targets
carefully and safeguard current earnings.
A major challenge facing top banking
strategists is wringing optimal performance from traditional
business lines while simultaneously transforming their
companies to compete in e-commerce. Unlike the lavishly-funded
dotcoms, traditional banks get clobbered by investors
when they spend too heavily on their Web ventures. Banks
also are held to a higher standard on earnings, while
many of the newcomers have latitude to operate at a loss
for extended periods of time.
This dilemma is being played out at
Chase Manhattan Corp. The nation's third largest bank
is struggling to shed its decades-old image of a volatile
money center bank while trying to stay at the forefront
of developments in the emerging world of e-commerce. Chief
executive William B. Harrison Jr. has publicly embraced
e-commerce as one of Chase's highest strategic priorities
since taking command in June 1999. He speaks frequently
on the subject and even took his top executives on a tour
of West Coast technology firms.
Not everyone embraces the new image
of Chase, however. Wall Street hasn't completely forgotten
about the lending and trading debacles encountered by
the predecessor entities prior to the 1996 merger of the
old Chase and Chemical Banking Corp. Some analysts point
out that many of Harrison's Web initiatives are still
in the embryonic stage, and that the company's overall
revenues remain heavily dependent on market-sensitive
business lines such as trading and venture capital investing.
Harrison is clear-eyed about the magnitude
of the selling job before him. Insists the 57-year-old
executive, "The new Chase is a very different organization,
characterized by leadership in business lines, improved
financial discipline and sharpened risk management. Market
perceptions tend to lag the realities of changed performance,
however, so the only way you change investor views is
by delivering consistently."
Harrison is devoting a quarter of a
billion dollars annually to e-commerce initiatives. Well
and good, analysts say, but he's got to muster these resources
in a way that doesn't hurt near-term profitability
and deploy them wisely. Like his counterparts at other
major U.S. banks, Harrison is wrestling with the issue
of how to nurture an entrepreneurial approach to e-commerce
without alienating traditional business lines. His answer
is a new business unit, chase.com, which serves as the
focal point for Internet-related initiatives. To coordinate
the unit with the rest of the company, he also formed
an Internet council comprised of senior executives from
all of Chase's major business lines.
There's no guarantee of success, however.
Many analysts perceive chase.com as a halfway measure
that neither immunizes the Internet business unit from
the bureaucratic entanglements of the traditional bank
nor adequately integrates e-commerce into the overall
company. It's too early to accord market value to the
infant unit, moreover, which came into being only last
June. Nor is it assured that Chase's current robust returns
from trading and venture capital investing will hold constant.
A major market upheaval would both crimp resources available
for reinvestment in e-commerce and re-ignite investor
concerns about earnings stability.
"The proportion of revenues derived
from capital market activities is at a historic high at
Chase, and that concentration creates more risk,"
says Michael Mayo, a banking analyst with Credit Suisse
First Boston. "Viewed over the course of the last
decade's bull market, Chase's market-sensitive revenue
trends do show some stability. But how far do you want
to extrapolate those trends?"
Degrees
of Separation
No matter how the revenue debate plays
out, Harrison has no choice but to look ahead. The competitive
landscape of financial services is changing at a dizzying
pace, and coping will require a series of organizational
transformations that can only be accomplished by elevating
e-commerce to a top strategic priority.
The threat is real: banking's traditional
product- and geography-centric service model is being
steadily supplanted by an electronic system that enables
customers to access all manner of providers at will. "Bill
Harrison gets it," says Morgan Stanley analyst David
B. Hilder. "He understands what Internet technology
is capable of doing to the financial intermediation business."
The question then becomes how to approach
e-commerce within the confines of a traditional business
model. Within the past year, most of the major banks have
appointed senior executives, or "e-commerce czars,"
to lead their Internet initiatives, and they have adopted
a variety of structures to support those czars. Bank One
Corp. and Citigroup carved out separate business units
that operate with a great deal of autonomy. By contrast,
FleetBoston Financial Corp. and Wells Fargo & Co. empowered
their individual business lines to pursue Web ventures.
Chase is somewhere in the middle.Executive
vice president Denis O'Leary, the bank's designated e-commerce
czar, runs chase.com as a separate unit. The explicit
intent is to nurture a Silicon Valley-type entrepreneurial
culture outside the normal bank bureaucracy. But O'Leary
also remains within the Chase chain-of-command, reporting
to vice chairman Neal S. Garonzik, and his unit is charged
with facilitating "new economy" initiatives
throughout the company. Along with Harrison and Garonzik,
O'Leary co-chairs Chase's Internet council, which includes
representatives of all the bank's major business lines.
Chase executives say some degree of
independence is necessary to generate fresh thinking among
chase.com's employees. But some analysts caution that
any degree of separation between e-commerce activities
and traditional business lines simply introduces another
level of bureaucracy into the traditional banking structure.
"Ultimately, the Internet will be a component of
almost every financial product," says Octavio Marenzi,
managing director of Celent Communications in Cambridge,
Mass. "Doing this in a separate business unit is
really a stopgap, short-term solution."
t's far too early to say whether chase.com
constitutes a durable business model. This structure dates
back only to last June, when Harrison replaced Walter
V. Shipley as CEO. And chase.com has already undergone
one management change, with O'Leary replacing retiring
vice chairman Joseph G. Sponholz in January. As Harrison
says, "It's early days yet."
Late
to the Party
Early days perhaps, but Harrison's e-mobilization
comes not a moment too soon. At least on the retail side,
Chase has lagged behind its peers. A Gomez Advisors survey
last November ranked Chase ninth among the largest banks
in terms of online market share. Worse, its customer satisfaction
index hovered at the same low level. "When it comes
to delivering Internet services to the retail consumer,
Chase is relatively late to the party," says Chris
Musto, director of financial services for Lincoln, Mass.-based
Gomez.
Harrison's catch-up strategy on the
retail side includes an embrace of electronic bill presentment
and payment, the process of delivering bills to a customer's
PC. Last year, Chase announced its participation in Spectrum
LLP, a joint venture with Wells Fargo and First Union
Corp. Spectrum has designed a "switch," or network
through which member banks can send and receive bills
processed by the major technology vendors and other banks.
Providing banks with the ability to aggregate most of
their customers' bills at one site is expected to boost
consumer acceptance of electronic bill payment, and therefore
of online banking in general.
Chase uses chase.com to manage its interest
in Spectrum, as well as its equity stake in Seattle-based
ShopNow.com, an online shopping portal that offers products
and services from more than 40,000 merchants. Chase is
positioning itself as the preferred credit card at this
site, where its cardholders receive special discounts.
If the arrangement works as expected, Chase will deliver
value to its existing customers while opening up a channel
for acquiring new ones.
There's some sentiment, however, that
Chase actually may have more opportunity on the business-to-business
side of e-commerce. While the bank does operate a national
consumer business, with leadership positions in mortgages,
credit cards, and auto finance, its retail franchise is
ultimately circumscribed by the narrow reach of its branch
network essentially a three-state patch of the
northeast (New York, New Jersey and Connecticut) and part
of Texas. Unless Chase engineers a major branch acquisition
something Harrison does not list as a priority
right now the company faces natural boundaries
on its online retail effort, since most Internet banking
customers remain wedded to physical locations for handling
their service needs.
Chase faces no such constraints on the
business-to-business side of e-commerce, where it can
leverage its commercial/wholesale bank, a global powerhouse
that operates in more than 50 countries and has relationships
with 70% of the top 1,000 multinational corporations.
One of chase.com's most promising projects, in fact, is
New York-based Intellysis Electronic Commerce Inc., which
provides an Internet network for major corporations to
purchase supplies. Chase acquired a 33% stake in this
electronic procurement company back in 1996, an investment
now overseen by O'Leary's group.
Harrison describes Intellysis as a means
of protecting Chase's position in the payment system as
it gradually moves online. He also touts the possibility
of a big one-time gain should Intellysis conduct an initial
public offering, which is widely expected to occur in
the first half of this year. Merrill Lynch analyst Judah
Kraushaar estimates this could produce a $1 billion after-tax
gain for Chase.
Halfway
Measures
Despite all the activity with Spectrum,
ShopNow.com and Intellysis, some e-commerce consultants
downplay chase.com as more public relations than substance.
They point out that Spectrum remains in the formative
stage while Intellysis is an ongoing relationship inserted
into the Internet unit's portfolio. "Chase.com is
great for public relations and makes Wall Street happy
that Chase is going after the Internet. But the proof
will come when chase.com introduces something that will
fundamentally challenge the company's existing business
model," says Jaime Punishill, with Forrester Research
in Cambridge, Mass.
Consultant Daniel W. Latimore describes
chase.com as "a kind of halfway measure." One
limitation is that chase.com has no real authority outside
its own small domain. O'Leary, for example, has no oversight
of Chase's investment banking and venture capital units,
which are also heavily involved in the new economy. "I
don't see this type of model sticking around in perpetuity,"
says Cambridge-based Latimore, director of e-strategy,
financial services industry, for Mainspring Inc. "Either
it will be spun off or it will be folded back into the
rest of the bank."
Chase executives say they have no immediate
plans to spin off chase.com, despite some public discussion
of that option last year. But O'Leary agrees that chase.com
is likely to look quite different five years from now.
"Financial services itself will be redefined,"
he says. "What was the traditional company and what
was the dotcom unit will be essentially merged into something
new."
Harrison's Internet strategy, in any
case, does not depend solely on the success of chase.com.
It also incorporates the activities of other units of
the company, some of them much more visible. The two most
important are Chase Capital Partners, a venture capital
fund, and Chase H&Q, the investment banking unit formed
after last year's acquisition of San Francisco-based Hambrecht
& Quist Group Inc. When combined with chase.com, these
units provide Harrison with a multi-faceted capability
to launch and sustain e-commerce projects.
CCP, for example, has invested in a
wide range of Internet/e-commerce companies, such as StarMedia
Network Inc., Cobalt Networks Inc., Digital Island Inc.
and Triton PCS Holdings Inc. Such relationships allow
Chase to monitor the technologies these firms are producing
and then, where applicable, purchase them for its own
needs. CCP, which has been around since 1984, helps Harrison
in another way by offsetting outlays on other e-commerce
projects.
When CCP investments go public, as many
have in the last two years, during the height of the market's
dotcom frenzy, Chase is able to cash out big. Last year,
CCP's $1.4 billion in profits contributed 26% of the bank's
overall operating profit. "People ask how legacy
companies can make money in this e-commerce space. Well,
we're doing it, not in terms of operating revenue but
as venture capitalists," Harrison says.
Hambrecht & Quist, Chase's recently
acquired brokerage firm, provides another critical strength.
The San Francisco-based investment banking house specializes
in small cap startups in media, telecommunications, information
technology and health care precisely the kinds
of companies that are shaping the new economy.
Harrison describes Chase H&Q as the
bank's window into the e-commerce world. The unit's officers
are able to monitor the latest developments from their
vantage point, and then they share their reconnaissance
with Chase's hierarchy. O'Leary, for example, says he
meets frequently with Daniel H. Case, head of Chase H&Q,
as well as Jeffrey C. Walker, who runs CCP. The way O'Leary
describes it, Chase has developed a very nonbank-like
culture at the highest levels where executives can share
ideas and plot strategy without regard for formal titles
and chains of command.
This spirit of collegiality is institutionalized
in Harrison's Internet council, which brings together
representatives of all the company's major business lines.
As part of his effort to prioritize e-commerce at Chase,
the CEO had every business unit designate a senior line
officer with responsibility for Web-enabling that particular
unit. These line executives, about 15 in all, meet with
Harrison, Garonzik and O'Leary once a month to discuss
e-commerce initiatives throughout the company. Says Harrison,
"You need some place where it all comes together,
one group that is the central repository of information.
This helps prioritize the use of what will always be limited
investment dollars."
Scarce
Resources
Effective prioritization is critical
if Chase is to succeed in establishing itself as a major
player in e-commerce. Harrison, like any legacy bank CEO,
faces constant pressure to maintain current earnings momentum
and provide an acceptable return to investors. "The
scarce resource for a public company like Chase is not
equity, but rather discretionary resources for reinvestment,"
Harrison says. "You have to carve out as many expense
dollars as you can while still meeting your financial
targets."
The amount of money Chase has budgeted
for e-commerce projects this year, $250 million, is not
huge in the total scheme of things it's only 8%
of the company's $3 billion technology budget. But it
is money that someday may be needed to compensate for
problems elsewhere in the company. Further complicating
the picture, Chase is constantly rumored to be in the
market for a big-league securities firm. Such a merger,
should it occur, could easily distract Harrison from his
e-commerce initiatives. It wouldn't be the first time
that a major institution announced plans to reinvent itself,
only to cast them aside when the next M&A deal came along.
Meanwhile, Harrison has to keep the
profit engine humming. Ever since the 1996 Chase/Chemical
merger, the "new" Chase has enjoyed steadily
improving results. Returns on assets and equity reached
1.47% and 23.7% respectively last year, helped by tremendous
gains from the company's capital markets units, which
includes trading, investment banking and venture capital.
Some core operations are sluggish, however. National consumer
services revenue was flat during the second half of last
year, for example, and credit card growth is slowing.
Moreover, many on Wall Street are concerned about potential
volatility, noting that capital markets revenues are tied
to the performance of equity and debt markets around the
world.
Chase executives argue that their market-related
revenues, while volatile on a quarter-to-quarter basis,
show a steady upward bias over a period of years, most
notably through the long 1990s bull market. Memories are
fresh, however, of the world financial crisis sparked
by a Russian bond default that hammered Chase's trading
revenues in the third quarter of 1998. While Chase weathered
the 1998 crisis handily, the next global financial meltdown
may be more long-lived. And that would surely impact Chase,
which is exposed to the world economy through its global
banking operations (which generated 65% of the company's
1999 earnings).
Given a prolonged downturn, would
Chase be able to maintain its level of e-commerce expenditures,
currently among the highest in the industry? Harrison
answers in the affirmative. Whatever external stresses
Chase may encounter, he remains committed to his Internet
investments, believing them to be essential. "We
prioritize that goal over others," Harrison says.
"It's just something we've got to do."
Mr. Cline
is senior editor of Banking Strategies.
Copyright © 2003 by Banking
Strategies, published by BAI.
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