| Shutting
Out Fraud
By Chris Costanzo
As check fraud migrates to smaller
institutions, banks of all sizes need to share more information
with each other.
Check fraud,
banks are discovering, is like an air bubble in a hose:
push down on one end and the bubble pops up at the other.
With the battle against fraudsters going well in the large-bank
arena, problems are now cropping up at smaller institutions.
The American Bankers Association's
biennial check fraud survey, released last November, shows
that the industry overall managed to keep check fraud
losses fairly level, even though the number of attempts
to foil the system doubled. But closer scrutiny of the
survey of 400 banks shows new cracks in the security fortress,
namely among community banks, and looming threats that
are potentially more insidious than traditional check
fraud.
The success that large banks have
had in using technology and information-sharing to defend
themselves is clearly shifting more of the fraud problem
to smaller institutions, which typically don't have the
resources and expertise to commit to the fight. But in
an industry whose viability depends on public trust and
confidence, the large banks will need to expand their
information-sharing practices to include grass-roots players.
Such cooperation would also help
the industry head off some other looming threats, the
two most serious of which are identity theft and fraud
stemming from the increased use of electronic transactions.
Large and small banks are equally vulnerable to these
emerging threats. Big banks must start rounding out their
current arsenal for fighting check fraud with measures
that address the new menaces. Small banks may have the
tougher job, as they need to begin reaching parity with
the larger institutions on basic fraud prevention routines
first.
"The place to solve fraud
will be at the industry level, not at the bank or regional
level," says Edward J. Potter, president of PSI Fraud
Solutions, a security consulting firm based in Staten
Island, N.Y. "It's critical that banks share information."
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Banding
Together
Check fraud began increasing noticeably
in the early to mid-'90s with the emergence of laser printers
that simplified the creation of counterfeit checks. Larger
banks responded to the challenge by adopting new technologies
of their own.
For example, nearly 150 banks
have enrolled in a fraud detection system maintained by
Dallas-based Carreker Corp. since it was rolled out in
1994. Known as "FraudLink," this software compares
account activity with a database of statistically "normal"
patterns, highlighting exceptions. In corporate banking,
meanwhile, institutions have gotten good results from
"positive-pay," a procedure by which companies
provide banks with lists of the checks they have issued,
virtually eliminating doubt about which checks may be
fraudulent.
Large banks have also banded together
to share information on fraud detection, beginning with
an informal effort by some regional banks in 1995. "Fraud
is not a competitive issue," says Robert W. Jones,
the director of operating risks at FleetBoston Financial
Corp. and a co-chair of the fraud steering committee of
the Banking Industry Technology Secretariat.
Since 1998, BITS and the ABA have
sponsored a loss-reporting program that evolved from the
earlier effort. Thirty-eight banks now participate in
quarterly conference calls, conducted by region over the
course of two days, in which they share information about
the volumes of losses they have suffered in 12 major categories
developed and standardized by BITS.
On these calls, bankers also trade
tips on techniques for stopping fraud. One bank, for example,
recently explained how its use of ultra-violet light detection
systems at the teller line had helped identify forged
drivers licenses. "Sharing of information is the
key to success," says Robin Slade, a BITS director.
Based on the results of the ABA
check fraud survey, BITS calculates that banks participating
in the loss-reporting program experienced a decrease in
check fraud of 3% per account, versus a 1% increase for
the industry as a whole. Large banks as a group, in fact,
seem to be getting the check fraud problem under control.
According to the ABA survey, banks with more than $5 billion
of assets were able to stop more than 80% of check-fraud
attempts, which dropped their share of total fraud losses
to 55%, from 60% in 1999.
Rebuffed by the large institutions,
fraudsters have shifted their attention elsewhere. The
share of losses at banks with less than $500 million of
assets more than doubled during the same period, from
6% to 13%. Community banks stopped only a little more
than half the fraud attempted at their institutions, according
to the ABA.
Another finding: although the
number of check-fraud incidents increased 34% to 600,085
cases in 2001, the average loss per case decreased from
$1,518 to $1,163 during the two-year period. This suggests
criminals have reduced the amounts on their fraudulent
checks to avoid detection, a response to the fact that
banks prioritize fraud investigation on checks over a
certain limit, usually about $1,000.
"Fraud has become less a
crime of opportunity and more a crime of careful planning
and multiple attempts," says Potter, a former executive
with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. "Fraudsters are
writing more checks against more accounts for smaller
dollar amounts."
Tracking
Software
Vendors have responded to these
trends by designing fraud-detection systems more appropriate
for smaller banks. Service bureau providers, who do much
of the data processing for small banks, are now offering
these systems. And Carreker introduced a PC-based version
of its FraudLink system for small banks about two years
ago. It plans to offer an application service provider
version of the system as well, which would deliver the
service cheaply over the Internet, says Paul A. Carrubba,
an executive vice president and managing director.
When it comes to information-sharing,
however, small banks face some difficulties. On the bright
side, the BITS program is open to members of the Independent
Community Bankers Association and other small-bank organizations.
It costs each institution only $1,000 a year to participate
per region, with a maximum cost of $2,000 a year to participate
in five regions.
However, few community banks have
the resources to effectively track fraud in all its forms
and thus are limited in what they can share among themselves.
"If you can't give information, you can't participate,"
says Debbie Teryison, the head of operations and client
care at Silicon Valley Bank, a $5.6 billion-asset institution
in Santa Clara, Calif. Teryison, in her previous job at
San Francisco-based Union Bank of California, helped create
the original group of regional banks that began sharing
fraud-loss data.
Community banks often can't get
a clear picture of the amount and type of check fraud
hitting them. While they could purchase "case management"
software to support fraud investigation, that can amount
to a six-figure expense. Absent a tracking mechanism,
executives are hard-pressed to convince upper management
that fighting fraud is worth the investment. "It's
really tough to get management to spend money on systems
that don't generate revenue," Teryison says.
She recommends that community
banks use basic database and spreadsheet software to start
tracking fraud volumes in the various categories developed
by BITS, which include counterfeit checks, forged signatures,
debit card fraud, and so on. A lot of work went into developing
the BITS categories, she says, "and that information
is available to anyone who wants it."
For the typical institution, patterns
will start to emerge after about a year of tracking losses,
and informed decisions can be made then about the most
effective type of fraud-fighting software to purchase.
Silicon Valley Bank, for example, spent one and a half
years tracking fraud losses before management finally
invested about $300,000 in detection software, Teryison
says. She expects to recoup the cost of the investment
through loss reduction within three to six months.
Bolstering the business case for
such investments, fraud detection software can also be
used to help an institution meet the requirements of 2001's
USA Patriot Act, which increases the obligations of banks
to monitor money-laundering activities. The software also
has value as a sales tool, since information on where
clients have other accounts appears in check kiting reports,
Teryison says.
Electronic
Drawbacks
Yet even as the industry strives
to cope with traditional check fraud, other threats are
looming. Identity theft is becoming a bigger problem and
electronification heralded as a means to curb fraud
is proving to have some vulnerabilities of its
own.
Fraud through electronic transactions
seems almost a misnomer, since much has been made of the
security-enhancing potential of innovations such as electronic
check presentment and imaging. Both are supposed to help
combat fraud by permitting institutions early access to
critical check data. And it's true that the benefit of
electronics outweighs the negative when it comes to fraud
prevention.
But every innovation in payments
opens the door to new ways of perpetrating crime. In fact,
check fraud today really might be better defined as "deposit-account
fraud," to cover the new forms of crime made possible
through transactions that go through the automated clearing
house and other electronic switches.
It turns out there are genuine
drawbacks to not having physical checks available for
human inspection. Electronic checks do not carry the physical
characteristics such as special coloring, raised
printing, or even smells that processing staff
rely on to detect fraud, for example. Vendors are addressing
this problem with systems that let authorized account
holders encrypt information, such as the payee name, account
number and dollar amount of a check, onto a bar code that
appears on the front of a check.
By decoding the information, banks
can authenticate the account holder as the originator
of the document, and also prove that check information
has not been altered. This bar-coded information can be
translated as easily from check images as physical checks.
"The technology is here," Potter says. "It
needs to be integrated into bank processes and merchant
processes."
Checks converted to ACH transactions
at the point of sale are even more difficult to physically
inspect than ECP and image items, since they are immediately
handed back to consumers and disappear from the processing
stream entirely.
Jane C. Yao, the ABA's managing
director of surveys and statistics, says the quarterly
reporting program run by BITS and the ABA only began collecting
data on ACH fraud last year, and not many banks were able
to provide information on it. ACH fraud includes not only
fraud that occurs at the point of sale, but also through
the telephone and the Internet. NACHA, the Electronic
Payments Association, based in Herndon, Va., says the
incidence of unauthorized ACH payments was 0.02% in 2001;
since this total includes honest mistakes, the amount
of actual fraud was probably less than that.
In the case of ACH conversions
at the point of sale, banks are concerned that they face
greater liability for fraudulent transactions once a check
is converted. Under Regulation CC, which covers check
transactions, consumers have a window of only 48 hours
to dispute a transaction and thus push the cost of a fraudulent
transaction onto a bank; under Regulation E, which covers
ACH transactions, consumers have a full 60 days to dispute
a transaction. "As liability shifts upstream, it's
much more important to know your customer," says
consultant Potter. "Now there's a real bottom line
to it."
The solution, as Potter and others
see it, is for banks to work more closely with merchants
to share information on fraudsters. In turn, "the
best thing for the merchants to do is interact more with
each other," Potter says.
That is an extension of a strategy
that has worked well for the industry so far. No one disputes
the power of sharing information to combat ever more wily
criminals. When it comes to fraud, the best defensive
strategy is share and share alike. And that applies to
banks of all sizes.
Ms. Costanzo
is a freelance writer based in Brooklyn, N.Y.
Copyright © 2003 by Banking
Strategies, published by BAI.
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