| Beyond
Regulatory Compliance
By Jeff Reichert
Watch for it to become a competitive
differentiator.
Should bankers start worrying now about
the Basel II capital guidelines for operational risk?
The new rules, after all, won't take hold until January
2008, when they replace the earlier Basel I guidelines.
There's also a widespread perception in the industry that
these rules are going to impact only the largest banks.
For bankers worried about competitive
differentiation, the answer is yes.
At the most basic level, the guidelines
will require financial institutions to begin focusing
on operational risk from a regulatory perspective. Banks
will likely have to put up some capital to reserve against
it, in addition to the reserves already placed against
credit, market, reputational, legal and other risks. It
is short-sighted, however, to relegate operational risk
management to the purview of the compliance group and
think "we've got it covered."
The effective management of operational
risk is a core competency; banks must either demonstrate
they have it now or will acquire it soon in order to remain
competitive. Regulatory concerns aside, the ability to
exercise control of operational risk spans the entire
organization. It ties directly to a bank's ability to
acquire capital in the markets; to control earnings volatility
that impacts stock price; to differentiate itself competitively;
and to protect its reputation for safety and soundness.
So, while Basel II may be the catalyst
for banks to address long-standing operational risk issues,
it's certainly not the only reason banks should care.
Heightened market visibility carries with it huge risks
for institutions that don't measure up. Putting the control
mechanisms in place to minimize operational risk has a
real financial payback. And the disparity between the
banks that choose to apply resources to identifying, measuring
and controlling their operational risks and those that
don't is soon going to become obvious.
Capital
Adequacy
Since the Basel Committee released
its preliminary consultative papers on operational risk
less than two years ago, some U.S. legislators have questioned
whether our country would even comply. After all, the
Committee holds no enforcement power over U.S. regulators,
financial institutions — or indeed, over the regulators
or banks of any country. But ultimately, even bankers
had to admit that in a global economy it was in the U.S.
banks' best interests to encourage economic stability
among the world's interacting financial institutions and
to have everyone playing by the same rules, at least on
paper.
So while there's still some jockeying
for position going on between the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
and the Office of Thrift Supervision about their respective
roles, enforcement tactics, punitive measures and ultimate
agendas, U.S. adoption of the Basel II Accord is a reality.
Now what does that mean for operational risk management?
From a definitional perspective, the
Committee considers operational risk to be "the risk of
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes,
people and systems or from external events." Examples
of the types of operational risk identified by the Committee
include internal theft and fraud; external theft and fraud;
employment practices and workplace safety; clients, products
and business practices; damage to physical assets; business
disruption and systems failures; and execution delivery
and process management.
The Basel Accord itself contains three
"pillars," or key elements. Pillar 1 relates to the calculation
of capital requirements; Pillar 2 to the supervisory review
of capital adequacy; and Pillar 3 to the public disclosure
of banks' operational risk management control process.
Under Pillar 1, there are three prescribed
methods for calculating the amount of capital a bank is
required to sustain relative to its level of operational
risk. These are the Basic Indicator approach; the Standardized
Approach; and the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA).
The Committee has stated that "internationally
active banks and banks with significant operational risk
exposure are expected to adopt over time the more risk-sensitive
AMA." Under this method, a bank can make its own assessment
of the amount of capital it needs to reserve against operational
risk, as long as its methodology for doing so is "sufficiently
comprehensive and systematic." In other words, AMA banks
have the potential to reduce their capital allocation
for operational risk. U.S. regulators have indicated that
some banks will be required to adopt the AMA, while others
may "opt in" to the AMA based on their own internal cost/benefit
analyses.
The Basic Indicator and Standardized
approaches are "targeted to banks with less significant
operational risk exposures" and generally require banks
to hold capital for operational risk equivalent to a fixed
percentage of gross income. Further, banks using these
two methods "are not permitted to recognize the risk-mitigating
impact of insurance." Thus, banks adopting the Basic Indicator
and Standardized Approaches have little flexibility to
reduce their required reserves against operational risk.
So by some estimates, the Basel Committee
has indeed set up a "big banks vs. all other banks" dichotomy.
It can be argued that there are no regulatory capital
advantages for non-AMA banks to make the investments necessary
to manage operational risk more effectively. And maybe
if Pillar1 of Basel II were the only reason for managing
operational risk, this assessment might ring true. But
it is only the tip of the iceberg in the broader regulatory
context of operational risk.
For openers, what about Basel's Pillar
3, which requires public disclosure of a bank's operational
risk management control process? Think about the implications
of that mandate for a moment. How will the processes an
organization discloses in its annual reports come across
to shareholders and potential investors, who now have
the ability to compare its level of operational control
to that of other banks? Or to the regulators, who already
have the mandate to scrutinize those processes and to
impose sanctions or even shut an institution down?
For another example, Section 302 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation requires disclosure of
"a list of all deficiencies in the internal controls and
information on any fraud that involves employees who are
involved with internal activities," as well as "any significant
changes in internal controls or related factors that could
have a negative impact on the internal controls." And
there is Section 404, which requires banks "to publish
information in their annual reports concerning the scope
and adequacy of the internal control structure and procedures
for financial reporting. This statement shall also assess
the effectiveness of such internal controls and procedures."
The point is that there's a consistent
message emerging here about the management of operational
risk. Fear of regulatory action is by no means, however,
the only or even best reason to manage operational risk.
Access
to Capital
Caught up in the issue of how much
capital regulators will expect their organizations to
reserve for operational risk, bankers have tended to focus
their efforts on gathering data to document operational
losses, seeking out industry benchmarks and building sophisticated
models to mitigate their capital reserves. But management
of operational risk is not just about capital adequacy,
it is also about access to capital.
Basel's Pillar 3 imposes public disclosure
requirements specifically designed to enable market participants
(investors, shareholders, analysts, rating agencies, etc.)
to evaluate a bank's level of operational risk and its
internal methodologies for controlling it. The Committee's
express purpose for this provision was to bring market
pressures to bear on banks to manage their operational
risks effectively, by benefiting banks that are good at
controlling operational risk and by making it more difficult
for those banks that do not have adequate operational
risk controls in place to be perceived favorably by the
market.
While the regulators have not yet opined
on their specific disclosure requirements under Basel's
Pillar 3, rating agencies are already devising their own
methodologies for evaluating a bank's level and management
of operational risk and how this operational risk evaluation
fits in and impacts their overall credit ratings. It is
fair to say that the rating agencies absolutely will take
operational risk levels and controls into consideration
in rating a bank. And since ratings provide a gauge to
investors on the level of credit risk of companies and
their securities, they have a direct impact on a bank's
ability to raise capital in the markets and on the price
a bank will have to pay for that capital. Thus, if non-AMA
banks choose to forgo investments in operational risk
control, the disparity between "big banks" using the AMA
and "smaller banks" using a standardized approach becomes
even more pronounced.
Exacerbating this condition is the
fact that larger banks are already more active in asset
securitization, providing an ongoing capability to free
up capital for additional investment that smaller banks
do not have at their disposal due to the limited relative
size of their loan portfolios. So if non-AMA banks elect
not to invest in enhancing their operational controls,
the AMA banks will simply continue to widen their competitive
advantage in the acquisition of capital. Non-AMA banks
will continue to have less and less access to capital
that is increasingly pricey until they are squeezed out
of the capital markets altogether.
Reducing
Earnings Volatility
Much attention has been focused on
obtaining historical data on operational losses to feed
into capital models being developed to calculate reserves
for operational risk. The position of some non-AMA banks
seems to be that they will wait for the AMA banks to develop
these models, then hope that these models, or a simplified
version thereof, will be made available to the non-AMA
banks without the risk or expense of participating in
their development. Whether through license agreements
that enable non-AMA banks to run these models in-house,
or through outsourcers that provide the capability, the
non-AMA banks will have a way to calculate their capital
requirement for operational risk by the time it is mandated
they do so.
That approach may be fine for computing
losses on a historical basis. But it does nothing to help
a bank predict its operational losses and/or mitigate
them. The significant industry-wide efforts that are taking
place to develop loss databases and to identify key risk
indicators are not an end in themselves. Rather, the end
goal is to eliminate, reduce or manage operational risks
in order to reduce the impact of unanticipated losses,
much as banks do in the credit risk arena today. And risks
that they can't eliminate, they price and/or sell off.
Bankers have been cognizant of the
credit risks associated with their businesses for as long
as they have been lending and have made great strides
over the past 15 years with data-driven approaches to
quantify, manage and price credit risk. However, the science
of operational risk management is less advanced —
perhaps because of the difficulty of identifying, quantifying,
controlling and pricing the diverse and wide-ranging types
and elements of operational risk. But make no mistake,
the impact of operational losses can be just as devastating
to earnings as any credit that goes south. A case in point
is the catastrophic collapse of Barings PLC in 1995, which
was caused by the activities of a single out-of-control
derivatives trader.
Managing operational risk is ultimately
about reducing earnings volatility by mitigating unanticipated
losses and by reserving against losses that can be expected.
Again, earnings volatility bears a direct relationship
to shareholder value and to market capitalization. The
better the organization's ability to control and price
unanticipated losses, the less earnings volatility the
bank will experience. It's in an organization's best interests
to control operational risk, entirely aside from Basel's
mandates.
Documentation
Problem
The core banking principles of "safety
and soundness" are no less applicable to managing operational
risk than they are to managing credit risk. But processes
to control operational risk are about to become a great
deal more visible than they have been in the past.
In most banks, operational procedures
are developed on an as-needed, evolutionary basis and
handed down from employee to employee. Whatever semblance
they bear to bank policy is relatively coincidental. Documentation
of day-to-day procedures is also non-existent. Moreover,
procedures for dealing with exceptions reside strictly
in the mind of someone who had to make up a way of handling
a problem that arose at one time.
So along comes Basel II. Operating
procedures and controls now have to be disclosed so they
can be evaluated and their quality rated by the regulators
and understood by the markets. Back up a minute. First,
these operating procedures have to be documented, which
they are not today. Back up another minute. Before we
can document procedures, we have to know what bank management's
policies are for handling every possible operating scenario
that could occur so our operating procedures can appropriately
reflect the bank's policy — on everything from check
collection to opening checking accounts, setting up treasury
services, credit limits, approval processes, credit scores,
portfolio concentrations, documentation, collateral, delinquencies,
etc.
Nowhere in any organization will you
find such a central repository of policies.
Not only does the lack of written,
explicit policies make the documentation of operating
procedures a daunting task, but banks will now be evaluated
and compared on how good their controls are. Managerial
strength and operational control become competitive differentiators
and an important piece of the fabric of the "safety and
soundness" doctrine.
Disclosure is not just a regulatory
issue, but a customer perception issue as well —
one that will inevitably affect customers' selection of
a financial institution. Banks are now in the position
of needing to demonstrate to a competitive market that
they have the organizational and procedural controls in
place to deal with operational risk in order to retain
and acquire business.
Legal Liability
The Risk Management Association (RMA)
has categorized operational risks into three basic types:
external risks, process risks and conduct risks. External
risks, consisting of damage to physical assets (fire,
flood, earthquake, etc.) and external theft and fraud,
are, in many ways, the most manageable because they are
insurable events. That is, the organization can offload
some or all of its exposure to these events by insuring
against them.
Process risks, consisting of execution,
delivery and process management risks, as well as business
disruption and systems failure, are largely controllable
through managed processes and procedures, adequate training,
automation, workflow management, productivity reporting
and effective business continuity planning. Process risks
are expected to become more stringently managed through
the documentation and disclosure of a bank's operational
controls, as discussed above.
The biggest and most unmanageable risk,
therefore, may be employee conduct risk, including employee
theft and fraud and employment and business practices.
The organization is legally liable for the actions of
its employees toward clients and the public generally,
so there are very real out-of-pocket costs associated
with employee failures. Intentional or unintentional employee
conduct issues can occur at every salary level, in every
department and in every location of every financial institution.
In addition, employee risks are virtually
impossible to predict and the financial consequences of
employees' actions are therefore the most difficult to
prevent. Losses can be substantial — as anyone who
has faced a multi-million dollar class action law suit
can attest. Further, employee conduct directly affects
an institution's reputation in the market, the financial
damage from which can be incalculable.
Operational risk is nothing to pass
over lightly or relegate to the compliance department.
With or without Basel II, financial institutions need
to start taking it seriously.
Mr.
Reichert is the director of decision support and information
services at Automated Financial Systems, a software, information
and consulting firm in Exton, Pa.
Copyright © 2004 by Banking
Strategies, published by BAI.
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